Organizations and Cyber crime: An Analysis of the Nature of Groups engaged in Cyber Crime

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Abstract
This paper explores the nature of groups engaged in cyber crime. It briefly outlines the definition and scope of cyber crime, theoretical and empirical challenges in addressing what is known about cyber offenders, and the likely role of organized crime groups. The paper gives examples of known cases that illustrate individual and group behaviour, and motivations of typical offenders, including state actors. Different types of cyber crime and different forms of criminal organization are described drawing on the typology suggested by McGuire (2012). It is apparent that a wide variety of organizational structures are involved in cyber crime. Enterprise or profit-oriented activities, and especially cyber crime committed by state actors, appear to require leadership, structure, and specialisation. By contrast, protest activity tends to be less organized, with weak (if any) chain of command.

Keywords: Cybercrime, Organized Crime, Crime Groups; Internet Crime; Cyber Offenders; Online Offenders, State Crime.

Introduction
Discussions of cyber crime, and of organized crime more generally, are plagued by stereotypes. On the one hand, the image of the lone hacker belies the collective nature of much cyber crime. On the other, conventional definitions of organized crime tend to be out of date, having been overtaken by the evolution of the phenomenon itself. This article will explore variations in the organization of cyber crime. It will note that while most organized cyber crime today is the work of skilled technicians who apply their knowledge to criminal activity, there are those “terrestrial” or conventional crime groups who have begun to harness digital technology in furtherance of criminal objectives. This distinction will erode in the fullness of time, as digital technology becomes more pervasive.

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Today, it requires an exceptionally closed mind to deny that states are also capable of criminal acts. Throughout recorded history, crimes by state actors have occurred in times of peace, as well as during armed conflicts. Most recently, one notes allegations of drug manufacture and counterfeiting by agents of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Perl, 2007). States have also engaged periodically in kidnapping and assassination, at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the literature on organized crime has thus far tended to overlook state and state-sponsored crime. Governments have long engaged in criminal activity directly, or have sought the assistance of terrestrial criminals to do their “dirty work.” Today, we find that numerous governments (or their proxies) are using Internet technologies to commit crime. Allegations that Russia has executed or encouraged distributed denial of service attacks, and that Chinese authorities are engaged in widespread economic and industrial espionage, have been matched by the disclosures of Edward Snowden that the United States Government has engaged in massive programs of cyber-surveillance. One might also note the offensive cyber operations against Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities (Sanger, 2012). Such activities may not be defined as criminal under the laws of the state that undertakes them, but are usually regarded as crimes by the state that is on the receiving end. And the activities in question are nothing, if not organized.

Following discussions of organized crime and cyber crime respectively, the article will review the work of McGuire (2012) and Chabinsky (2010) on varieties of cyber crime organization, then introduce a number of cases of cyber crime committed by individuals and by organizations. It will conclude by differentiating the objectives of individual and organizational cyber crime offenders, and then will assess the robustness of the McGuire and Chabinsky typologies.

Organized criminal groups in the cyber space

While many types of cyber crime require a high degree of organization and specialization, there is insufficient empirical evidence to ascertain if cyber crime is now dominated by organized crime groups and what form or structure such groups may take (Lusthaus, 2013). Digital technology has empowered individuals as never before. Teenagers acting alone have succeeded in disabling air traffic control systems, shutting down major e-retailers, and manipulating trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000). What individuals can do, organizations can also do, and often better. It is apparent that many if not all types of criminal organization are capable of engaging in cyber crime. The Internet and related technologies lend themselves perfectly to coordination across a dispersed area. Thus, an organized crime group may be a highly structured traditional mafia like group that engages delinquent IT professionals. Alternatively, it could be a short-lived project driven by a group that undertakes a specific online crime and/or targets a particular victim or group. Rather than groups, it may involve a wider community that is exclusively based online and dealing in digital property (e.g. trading in ‘cracked’ software or distributing obscene images of children). It may also consist of individuals who operate alone but are linked to a macro-

5 The Internet has been used to communicate a wide variety of content deemed offensive to the point of criminal prohibition in one or more jurisdictions. Such material includes child pornography, neo Nazi propaganda, and advocacy of Tibetan independence, to list but a few. Jihadist propaganda and incitement messages also abound in cyber space.
criminal network (Spapens, 2010) as may be found in the ‘darknet’ and underground Tor sites.

Governments, law enforcement agencies, academic researchers, and the cyber-security industry speculate that ‘conventional’ organized crime groups have become increasingly involved in digital crime. The available empirical data suggest that criminals, operating online or on the ground, are more likely to be involved in loosely associated illicit networks rather than formal organizations (Décary-Hétu & Dupont, 2012). In recent years, insurgent and extremist groups have used Internet technology as an instrument of theft in order to enhance their resource base. Imam Samudra, convicted architect of the 2002 Bali bombings, reportedly called upon his followers to commit credit card fraud in order to finance militant activities (Sipress, 2004).

Cyber criminals may operate as loose networks, but evidence suggests that members are still located in close geographic proximity even when their attacks are cross-national. For example, small local networks, as well as groups centred on relatives and friends, remain significant actors. Cybercrime hot spots with potential links to organized crime groups are found in countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Kshetri, 2013a; see also Jones, 2010). Hackers from Russia and Ukraine are regarded as skilful innovators. For example, the cyber crime hub in the small town of Râmnicu Vâlcea in Romania is one of a number of such hubs widely reported in Eastern Europe (Bhattacharjee, 2011). There is also increasing concern about cyber crime in China (China Daily, 2010; Pauli, 2012). The source and extent of malware attacks (whether of domestic or foreign origin) and the scale of malware-botnet activity remain unclear, but a substantial proportion of Chinese computers are compromised and it is likely that local crime groups play a crucial role (Kshetri, 2013a; Chang, 2012; Kshetri, 2013b; Broadhurst & Chang, 2013). A recent study of spam and phishing sources found that these originated from a small number of ISPs (20 of 42,201 observed), which the author dubbed ‘Internet bad neighbourhoods.’ One in particular, Spectranet (Nigeria), was host to 62% of IP addresses that were spam related. Phishing hosts were mostly located in the United States, while spam originated from ISPs located in India, Brazil and Vietnam (Moura, 2013).

Given the diversity of the types and sources of cyber crime, it is important to avoid stereotypical images of cyber criminals, or spreading an alarmist or ‘moral panic’ narrative. Popular images include the menacing Russian hacker in pursuit of profit, or more recently the Chinese ‘hacker patriot.’ Such offender images offer a specific type of ‘folk devil;’ Wall (2012) regards them as inherently misleading about the assumptions of offender action and sources of cyber crime. Despite the media image, offenders come from many nations and motivations are diverse, although financial goals appear to dominate.7

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6 Tor is an encrypted re-routing service designed to obscure the original source of an email or website on the Internet, sometimes known as The Onion Router. Law enforcement concerns about the widespread misuse of Tor recently led Japanese police to recommended blocking access to the service to those that misuse it (BBC Technology, 'Japanese police target users of Tor anonymous network', 22 April 2013, Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22248692.

7 The 2012 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report identified that 75% of 621 confirmed breaches of data were financially motivated. Available at http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf.
The standard definition of organized crime contained in the UN Palermo Convention, based on the participation of three or more persons acting in concert, does not extend to certain highly sophisticated forms of organization such as the mobilization of robot networks that may be operated by a single person. So-called botnets involve an offender using malicious software to acquire control over a large number of computers (the largest including more than a million separate machines). Even though the individual and institutional custodians of compromised computers may be unwitting participants in a criminal enterprise, some commentators maintain that botnets mobilized by a sole offender should be considered a form of organized crime (Chang, 2012).

Based as it is on diplomacy, consensus, and inclusiveness, the UN is disinclined to confront state and state-sponsored criminal activity, whether on the ground or in cyberspace. Although one can appreciate the difficulties inherent in regarding one or more member nations as criminals, it is nevertheless unfortunate that the UN, one of the largest and most prestigious organizations concerned with transnational organized crime, overlooks this important dimension.

**Challenges of Theory and Evidence**

The absence of evidence about the extent, role, and nature of organized crime groups in cyber space impedes the development of sound countermeasures. While a growing number of experts consider that cyber crime has become the domain of organized groups and the days of the lone hacker are past, little is yet known about the preferred structures and longevity of groups, how trust is assured, and the relationship with other forms of crime. There is an absence of evidence-based research about offender behaviour and recruitment in cyber space, although learning and imitation play important roles (Broadhurst & Grabosky, 2005). Hence, organized crime groups cannot be understood from their functional (illicit) activities alone, that is – as rational profit-driven networks of criminal actors– since socio-cultural forces also play an important role in the genesis and sustainability of such groups. In some cases obsessive-compulsive behaviour is evident; in others, a sense of impunity (born of over-confidence in anonymity) is apparent. As noted above, greed may be only one of many motives. Others may be present to varying degrees, depending on the types of crime.

**Structure**

McGuire’s (2012) review, based on a large sample of known cases, found that up to 80% of cyber crime could be the result of some form of organized activity. This does not mean, however, that these groups take the form of traditional, hierarchical organized crime groups or that these groups commit exclusively digital crime. Rather, the study suggests that traditional organized crime groups are extending their activities to the digital world alongside newer, looser types of crime networks. Crime groups show various levels of organization, depending on whether their activity is purely aimed at online targets, uses online tools to enable crimes in the ‘real’ world, or combine online and offline targets.

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8 Article 2(a) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines an ‘organized criminal group [as] a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’. Article 2(c) clarifies that ‘a structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure’ (United Nations, 2004).
McGuire’s review estimated that half the cyber crime groups in his sample comprised six or more people, with one-quarter of groups comprising over 10 individuals. One-quarter of cyber crime groups had operated for less than 6 months. However, the size of the group or the duration of their activities did not predict the scale of offending, as small groups can cause significant damage in a short time.

McGuire (2012) has suggested a typology of cyber crime groups, which comprises six types of group structure. He emphasized that ‘these basic organizational patterns often cross-cut in highly fluid and confusing ways’ and the typology represents a ‘best guess,’ based on what we currently know about cyber offenders. He notes that the typology is likely to change as the digital environment evolves. McGuire’s typology includes three main group types, each divided into two subgroups depending on the strength of association between members:

Type I groups operate essentially online and can be further divided into swarms and hubs. They are mostly ‘virtual’ and trust is assessed via reputation in online illicit activities.

- **Swarms** share many of the features of networks and are described as ‘disorganized organizations [with] common purpose without leadership.’ Typically swarms have minimal chains of command and may operate in viral forms in ways reminiscent of earlier ‘hacktivist’ groups. Swarms seem to be most active in ideologically driven online activities such as hate crimes and political resistance. The group Anonymous illustrates a typical swarm-type group (Olson, 2012): see Figure 1.

![](image1)

**Figure 1: Simplified visual illustration of a swarm.**

- **Hubs**, like swarms, are essentially active online but are more organized with a clear command structure. They involve a focal point (hub) of core criminals around which peripheral associates gather. Their online activities are diverse, including piracy, phishing attacks, botnets and online sexual offending. McGuire reports that the distribution of scareware often involves hub-like groups. Markets that trade in credit card details and narcotics bazaars such as Silk Road would also fit this model ([United States of America v Ross William Ulbricht, 2013](https://example.com)): see Figure 2.
Type II groups combine online and offline offending and are described as ‘hybrids’, which in turn are said to be ‘clustered’ or ‘extended.’

- In a clustered hybrid, offending is articulated around a small group of individuals and focused around specific activities or methods. They are somewhat similar in structure to hubs, but move seamlessly between online and offline offending. A typical group will skim credit cards, then use the data for online purchases or on-sell the data through carding networks (McGuire, 2012, p. 50; Soudijn & Zegers, 2012).

- Groups of the extended hybrid form operate in similar ways to the clustered hybrids but are a lot less centralized. They typically include many associates and subgroups and carry out a variety of criminal activities, but still retain a level of coordination sufficient to ensure the success of their operations.

Type III groups operate mainly offline but use online technology to facilitate their offline activities. McGuire argues that this type of group needs to be considered because they are increasingly contributing to digital crime. Like the previous group-types, Type III groups can be subdivided into ‘hierarchies’ and ‘aggregates’, according to their degree of cohesion and organization.

- Hierarchies are best described as traditional criminal groups (e.g. crime families), which export some of their activities online. For example, the traditional interest of some mafia groups in prostitution now extends to pornography websites; other examples include online gambling, extortion, and blackmail through threats of shutting down systems or accessing private records via malware attacks or hacking.
Aggregate groups are loosely organized, temporary, and often without clear purpose. They make use of digital technologies in an ad hoc manner, which nevertheless can inflict harm. Examples include the use of Blackberry or mobile phones to coordinate gang activity or public disorder, as occurred during the 2011 UK riots or the Sydney riots in September 2012 (Cubby & McNeilage, 2012).

The most sophisticated cyber crime organizations are characterized by substantial functional specialization and divisions of labour. The following roles, outlined in a speech by a representative of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division, illustrate the kind of roles that a major fraud conspiracy may entail (Chabinsky, 2010):

- Coders or programmers write the malware, exploits, and other tools necessary to commit the crime.
- Distributors or vendors trade and sell stolen data, and vouch for the goods provided by the other specialties.
- Technicians maintain the criminal infrastructure and supporting technologies, such as servers, ISPs, and encryption.
- Hackers search for and exploit vulnerabilities in applications, systems, and networks in order to gain administrator or payroll access.
- Fraud specialists develop and employ social engineering schemes, including phishing, spamming, and domain squatting.
- Hosts provide “safe” facilities of illicit content servers and sites, often through elaborate botnet and proxy networks.
- Cashers control drop accounts and provide those names and accounts to other criminals for a fee; they also typically manage individual cash couriers, or “money mules.”
- Money mules transfer the proceeds of frauds which they have committed to a third party for further transfer to a secure location.
- Tellers assist in transferring and laundering illicit proceeds through digital currency services and between different national currencies.
- Executives of the organization select the targets, and recruit and assign members to the above tasks, in addition to managing the distribution of criminal proceeds.

This ideal type is not necessarily limited to a formal, fixed organization. Some functions may be outsourced, as was the case with the Koobface group discussed below. The organization of cyber crime may also occur at a wider level involving networks of individuals who meet and interact within online discussion forums and chat rooms. Some discussion forums function as 'virtual' black markets that advertise, for example, stolen credit card numbers (Holt & Lampke, 2010). Among Chinese cyber criminals, QQ is a popular instant messaging and chat service, as well as the preferred choice for private contact linked to ‘carding’ – the market in stolen credit cards and their acquisition (Yip, 2011). Given the ephemeral nature of many of the interactions, such networks operate as criminal macro-networks rather than closely knit groups.
There may also be other potentially useful paradigms of describing organizations in cyber crime. Drawing from economic geography, the clustering of businesses that provide similar products in the same vicinity is commonly found throughout the world. Tor sites, such as Silk Road, become ‘hot spots’ for illicit markets by attracting buyers and sellers involved in the online drug trade. Likewise, Râmnicu Vâlcea, mentioned previously, consists of a high concentration, or cluster, of offenders in a single city in Eastern Europe. In organizational studies, complexity theory, derived from systems theory, may also help explain the dynamic nature and collective behaviour of groups. Cybercrime groups may, engage in one type of crime, and then move to other crimes that use different modus operandi. Carberp, a software tool kit designed to steal from banks, initially intended for private use, accessible only to small exclusive group of cyber criminals, but was later available for sale to others; an illustration of the way a criminal business model evolves.

**Examples of cyber crimes and offenders**

The first set of illustrative cases involves individual offenders.

1. **Ryan Cleary: DDoS on SOCA**
   Police in the UK arrested 19-year-old Ryan Cleary for allegedly orchestrating a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against the website of the British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) website in 2011, and the websites of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and the British Phonographic Industry during the previous year. Cleary allegedly rented and sublet a large botnet to conduct the attack. He was associated with the hacking group LulzSec, although the group itself denied that he was a member, claiming that he was merely a loose associate. Cleary’s arrest followed his exposure by Anonymous who published his name, address, and phone number as retaliation for his hacking into the group AnonOps’ website and exposing over 600 nicknames and IP addresses. Cleary was reported as stating that AnonOps was ‘publicity hungry.’ He pleaded guilty to most of the charges, and in May 2013 was sentenced to imprisonment for 32 months (The Guardian, 2013; see also Olson, 2012). The motive here appears to have been grounded in ideology and the desire to challenge powerful interests.

2. **Andrew Auernheimer: Apple iPad Snoop**
   In June 2010, 25-year-old Andrew Auernheimer managed to obtain the email addresses of 114,000 iPad users including celebrities and politicians, by hacking the website of the telecommunication company AT&T. Auernheimer was a member of the group Goatse Security, that specializes in uncovering security flaws. The attack was carried out when Auernheimer and other hackers realized they could trick the AT&T site into offering up the email address of iPad users if they sent an HTTP request that included the SIM card serial number for the corresponding device. Simply guessing serial numbers, a task made easy by the fact that they were generated sequentially during manufacturing, allowed access to a large number of addresses. Auernheimer and Goatse released details about the attacks to Gawker Media. Shortly after, the FBI arrested Auernheimer in connection with the breach. In March 2013, he was sentenced to 3 ½ years in prison for exploiting an AT&T security flaw (Chickowski, 2011; Thomas, 2013). The facts here are consistent with a desire to demonstrate technical proficiency.
3. **Aaron Swartz: Content Downloader**

A programmer and Fellow at Harvard University’s SafraCenter for Ethics, 24-year-old Aaron Swartz was indicted in 2011 after he downloaded more than 4 million academic articles through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) network connection to JSTOR, an online academic repository. Swartz used anonymous log-ins on the network in September 2010 and actively worked to mask his log-ins when MIT and JSTOR tried to stop the massive drain of copyrighted material. After JSTOR shut down the access to its database from the entire MIT network, Swartz went on campus, directly plugged his laptop in the information infrastructure of a MIT networking room, and left it hidden as it downloaded more content. However, an IT administrator reported the laptop to the authorities. A hidden webcam was installed and when Swartz came and picked up his laptop, he was identified and arrested. Swartz did not steal any confidential data and, once the content of the site had been secured, JSTOR did not wish to initiate legal action; however, federal prosecutors went ahead and charged Swartz with 13 felony counts (*United States of America v Aaron Swartz*, 2012).

Swartz was known as ‘a freedom-of-information activist’ who called for civil disobedience against copyright laws, particularly in relation to the dissemination of publicly funded research. Swartz said he was protesting how JSTOR stifled academic research and that he had planned to make the articles he downloaded publicly and freely available. Swartz committed suicide in early 2013, before his court case was finalised. His family accused the government of having some responsibility for his death because of the overzealous prosecution of what they described as a non-violent victimless crime. In March 2013 he was posthumously awarded the James Madison Award by the American Library Association, a prize to acknowledge those who champion public access to information (Bort, 2013; Cohen, 2013). Swartz, whose activities were consistent with the hacker ethos that information should be free, was obviously rebelling against the prevailing system of intellectual property protection.

4. **Christopher Chaney: Celebrity Hackerazzi**

In what amounted to ‘cyber stalking’, celebrity-obsessed Christopher Chaney, aged 35, used publicly available information from celebrity blog sites to guess the passwords to Google and Yahoo email accounts owned by over 50 stars, including Scarlett Johansson, Mila Kunis, and Christina Aguilera. He successfully managed to hack into the accounts and set up an email-forwarding system to send himself a copy of all emails received by the stars. From November 2010 to October 2011, Chaney had access to emails, photos, and confidential documents. He was responsible for the release of nude photos of Scarlett Johansson that subsequently circulated on the Internet. He was also accused of circulating nude photos of two (non-celebrity) women but he denied this. FBI investigators did not give details of how they tracked Chaney, who was sentenced to 10 years jail in December 2012. Chaney apologized for his actions; he said that he empathized with the victims but could not stop what he was doing (Eimiller, 2011; Chickowski, 2011). The facts indicate voyeurism reinforced by obsessive/compulsive behaviour.

5. **Sam Yin: Gucci Hacker**

Fired after being accused of selling stolen Gucci shoes and bags on the Asian grey market, a former Gucci IT employee, Sam Yin, aged 34, managed to hack into the
company’s system using a secret account he had created while working, and a bogus employee’s name. He shut down the whole operation’s computers, cutting off employee access to files and emails for nearly an entire business day. During that day he deleted servers, destroyed storage set-ups and wiped out mailboxes. Gucci estimated the cost of the intrusion at $200,000. Yin was sentenced to prison for a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 6 years in September 2012 (Italiano, 2012). This appears to have been a clear case of retaliation by a disgruntled former employee.


Originally from York, Northern England, 23-year old Edward Pearson stole 8 million identities, 200,000 PayPal account details, and 2,700 bank card numbers between January 2010 and August 2011. Using the malware ZeuS and SpyEye, which he used to suit his purpose, he managed to not only hack into the PayPal website but also into the networks of AOL and Nokia, which remained down for two weeks. Pearson was finally caught after his girlfriend tried to use forged credit cards to pay hotel bills. He was described as ‘incredibly talented’ and a clever computer coder, who had been active in cyber crime forums for several years prior to his hacking spree. His lawyer, however, argued that Pearson was not so interested in making money but that hacking was ‘an intellectual challenge’. A prosecutor estimated that based on the information he had taken, he could potentially have stolen $13 million; yet, before his arrest, he had only stolen around $3,700, which he had spent on takeaway meals and mobile phone bills. Pearson was sentenced to 26 months jail in April 2012 (Liebowitz, 2012).

All the above offenders were male; four were under 30 when they committed their offences, the other two were in their mid-30s. Only one of these cases had a financial motive, although Pearson, the offender, denied this. Cleary and Auernheimer claimed that the reason for their offending was, at least in part, altruistic. They wanted to demonstrate that despite claims to the contrary, the data repository of large corporations and organizations, which kept important confidential information on their clients, was not secure. It is likely that the desire for fame and recognition of their skills also played a part in their actions. Swartz was also motivated by ideology and believed that information should be freely accessible. The two other hackers were pushed by emotional reasons: Chaney by his obsession with celebrities, and Yin, by his desire for revenge after losing his job. Pearson benefited financially from hacking, but he could potentially have stolen much more. The final case illustrates the potential harm that just one cyber criminal might cause. All faced the risk of long prison sentences, but none was deterred by the prospect.

The next set of cases involves small groups or networks of offenders, and illustrates the diversity of criminal organizations operating across crime types.

7. LulzSec and Sony Hackers

Cody Kretsinger (nicknamed Recursion) was arrested for allegedly carrying out an attack against Sony Pictures on behalf of LulzSec in September 2011. Kretsinger, aged 25, was arrested when the UK-based proxy server HideMyAss, a service that disguises the online identity of its customers, provided logs to police. These allowed them to match time-stamps with IP addresses and identify Kretsinger (Chickowski, 2011; Olson, 2012). In April 2012, Kretsinger pleaded guilty to unauthorised access, conspiracy and attempting to break into computers, and he was later sentenced to one year in jail and 1,000 hours community service. Kretsinger, along with other members of LulzSec, obtained
confidential information from the computer systems of Sony Pictures by using an SQL injection attack against the website. They disseminated the stolen data on the Internet. The stolen data contained confidential information such as names, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses for thousands of Sony customers. The hackers did not use the data illegally but wanted to demonstrate that Sony’s website was not secure. Hector Xavier Monsegur, 28, the former alleged leader of LulzSec, was arrested in June 2011 and agreed to act as an informant for the FBI. He provided information on his fellow hackers and is believed to have played an important role in their identification and arrest. Other members of LulzSec included Ryan Cleary (19), Ryan Ackroyd (27), Mustafa al-Bassam (18), Jake Davis (18). All pleaded guilty and were sentenced in May 2013 (Italiano, 2012). On 24 April 2013, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) arrested a Sydney man, Matthew Flannery, known online as Aush0k, alleged to have been the leader of the LulzSec hacking group. The activities in question constituted a protest against the commercialism of the online entertainment industry, as well as a desire to demonstrate technical proficiency.

8. Dreamboard

Dreamboard was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children under the age of twelve, until its interdiction by a multi-national police investigation begun in 2009. The operation resulted in charges against 72 people in 14 countries across five continents. Servers were situated in the United States, and the group’s top administrators were located in France and Canada. Rules of conduct on the site’s bulletin board were printed in English, Russian, Japanese and Spanish. It was a very sophisticated operation that vetted prospective members, required continuing contributions of illicit material as a condition of membership, and rewarded those who produced and shared their own content. Members achieved status levels reflecting the quantity and quality of their contributions. The group used aliases rather than their actual names. Links to illicit content were encrypted and password-protected. Access to the group’s bulletin board was through proxy servers. These routed traffic through other computers in order to mask a member’s true location, thereby impeding investigators from tracing the member’s online activity (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011). The primary objective of participants in the enterprise was sexual gratification, although competition for status within the group was also evident.

9. DrinkOrDie

DrinkOrDie, founded in Moscow in 1993, was a group of copyright pirates who illegally reproduced and distributed software, games, and movies over the Internet. Within three years the group expanded internationally and counted around 65 members in 12 countries including Britain, Australia, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the US. The membership included a relatively large proportion of undergraduate university students and IT professionals who were technologically sophisticated and skilled in security, programming, and Internet communication. The group was highly organized, hierarchical in form, and entailed a division of labour. A new program was often obtained through employees of software companies; ‘crackers’ stripped the content of its electronic protection; ‘testers’ made sure the unprotected version worked; and ‘packers’ distributed the pirated version to around 10,000 publicly accessible sites around the Internet. The content was available to casual users and to other criminal enterprises for commercial distribution. Members were not motivated by profit but by their desire to compete with
other pirates and to achieve recognition as the first group to distribute a perfect copy of a newly pirated product. DrinkOrDie’s most prominent achievement was its illegal distribution of Windows 95 two weeks prior to the official release by Microsoft. The group was dismantled by authorities in 2001 and 20 members were convicted worldwide. Eleven people, including one woman, were prosecuted in the US in 2002. Their ages ranged between 20 and 34 years. Two of the leaders were sentenced to 46 and 33 months jail respectively (US Department of Justice, 2001, 2002). The principals in this case were seeking “bragging rights”—the celebrity (or notoriety) that accompanies being the first to distribute a perfect version of pirated content prior to the commercial release of the product.

10. DarkMarket

DarkMarket, founded in 2005, was a website providing the infrastructure for an online bazaar where buyers and sellers of credit card and banking details could meet, and illicit material such as malicious software could be purchased. Banking and card details were illicitly obtained by various means, including surreptitious recording at ATMs using ‘skimming’ devices, unauthorized access to personal or business information systems, or techniques of ‘social engineering’ where victims were persuaded to part with the details. Initially, trading in stolen information occurred on a one-to-one basis, but given the sheer volume of such material, using a forum where prospective parties could interact collectively was much more efficient. At its peak, DarkMarket was the world’s pre-eminent English language ‘carding’ site, with over 2500 members from a number of countries around the world, including the UK, Canada, the US, Russia, Turkey, Germany and France. The group was highly organized. Prospective vendors had to prove that they were able to provide useable credit card information, which was assessed for its validity. Members were nominated and vetted. A maximum of four administrators ran the site at any time. They ensured the security of the site, provided an escrow service, and patrolled the site for ‘illicit’ activity such as dealing in drugs or child pornography. It seemed that reputation and status was more important for these VIP members than was self-enrichment. Ordinary members, who traded in information and used the information they bought to make money, generally sought to keep a low profile. The forum was infiltrated by an FBI agent and the investigation resulted in 60 arrests worldwide. One of the most prominent members, a 33-year-old Sri-Lankan born British man, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment in March 2010 (Glenny, 2011; Davies, 2010).

11. DNSChanger

Six Estonian men, posing as the legitimate company Rove Digital, were arrested in November 2011 for creating and operating the DNSChanger malware, which allowed them to control Domain Name System (DNS) servers. DNS is an Internet service that converts domain names into numerical data that computers understand. Without DNS and DNS servers, Internet browsing, access to websites, and emails would be impossible. The group was running an Internet fraud operation that enabled them to manipulate Internet advertising. The malware was propagated using social engineering techniques; in one instance, the malware was offered as a video code that was supposedly required to watch adult movies. At its peak, an estimated four million computers worldwide were infected with the malware. DNSChanger worked by substituting advertising on websites with advertising sold by Rove Digital and by redirecting users of infected computers to
rogue servers controlled by affiliates of the group. When users clicked on the links to a licit official website, they were in fact taken to a fake website that resembled the legitimate website but promoted counterfeit, and sometimes dangerous, products. The group allegedly netted $14 million in stolen advertising views. Operation Ghost Click, a five-year collaboration between the FBI and private corporations, began after Trend Micro researchers identified the gang’s botnet. The six offenders were aged between 26 and 31 years. It is likely they will all be extradited to the US for trial. A seventh member of the group, a 31-year-old Russian man, has not yet been arrested (US Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011; Krebs on Security, 2011). The primary motive of participants was clearly financial.

12. Carberp

Carberp is malicious software designed to steal banking information. When it first appeared in 2009, Carberp was used exclusively by a small, closed group operating only in Russian-speaking countries. In 2011 the malware’s creators started selling it to a few customers in the former Soviet Union. In March 2012, following a joint investigation with Group-IB, a Russian cyber security firm, Russian authorities arrested eight Carberp operators. The group was led by two brothers in their late 20s. One of them was already a known criminal with a record related to real estate fraud. The group demonstrated a high level of collaboration. Carberp’s group members were working remotely from different cities in Ukraine. Using stolen banking data, they illegally transferred large sums of money into accounts controlled by the group. The money was then withdrawn from a variety of ATM machines in the Moscow area. It is estimated the group had stolen around $2 million from over 90 victims (Warner, 2012).

Despite the arrests, Carberp continued to evolve with added functionality. It has worked with three different cyber crime groups (Matrosov, 2012). The first group had a direct association with the creator of the malware. In 2010, Carberp source code was sold to the organizer of the second group and they worked in parallel to develop a second version. The third group was already engaged in online bank fraud with the botnet Origami Hodprot but switched to using Carberp in 2011. As the botnet grew, the group’s operations became increasingly organized and members of the group were highly coordinated. They had command-and-control servers in several European countries and the US, and attacked Russian as well as foreign banks. In December 2012, members from the Carberp team posted messages on underground Russian cyber crime forums, offering a new version of Carberp for rent. At US$40,000 per month, this was one of the most expensive kits thus far advertised. Carberp is said to be more effective and more dangerous than ZeuS and SpyEye, and might soon be able to target US and Australian banks (Constantin, 2012). With various reports of the Carberp source code being available online in mid-2013, there are fears that improved ‘copycat’ variants may be developed and released in the near future. Here too, the primary motive was financial.

13. ‘Unlimited Operation’

On 9 May 2013 eight men were charged in New York with stealing US$ 2.8 million in cash from a number of ATM machines. These men formed the New York cell of an international cyber crime ring running ‘unlimited operations’. The headquarters of the cyber gang is located outside of the US, but there may be other cells in the US. The masterminds of the group had hacked the network of global financial institutions to steal
prepaid debit card data. They managed to eliminate the withdrawing limit on these cards. Using fake cards manufactured from the stolen data, ‘casher crews’ were able to withdraw virtually unlimited funds from ATMs around the world. The individuals charged in New York comprised one of these ‘casher crews.’ It was later found that the leader of the gang had been murdered in April 2013. Six of the seven suspects were under 25 years, and all were US citizens. Two worked as bus drivers for a private company. The New York gang conducted two successful operations. During the first one, in December 2012, a total of US$ 5 million was withdrawn from ATMs in 20 countries. In New York City, the group scoured 140 ATMs, and stole US$ 400,000 in just 2 hours and 25 minutes. The second operation went for just over 10 hours on 19–20 February 2013. Worldwide, over US $40 million was taken; in New York City, the defendants withdrew US$ 2.4 million from around 3,000 ATMs. The success of such attacks was attributed to the speed and meticulous planning of these ‘unlimited operations’. The New York prosecutor remarked:

‘Unlimited operations’ are marked by three characteristics: 1) the surgical precision of the hackers carrying out the cyber-attacks, 2) the global nature of the cyber crime organization, and 3) the speed and coordination with which the organization executes its operations on the ground. These attacks rely upon both highly sophisticated hackers and organized criminal cells whole role is to withdraw the cash as quickly as possible’ (US Attorney’s Office, 2013).

The sophisticated division of labour was the basis for participants’ enrichment.

14. Koobface
Koobface is a worm-based malware that targets Web 2.0 social networks such as Facebook (the name of the malware is an anagram of Facebook). Koobface spread by sending messages to ‘friends’ of an infected Facebook account user. The message directed the recipient to a fake website where they were prompted to download what was presented as an update to Adobe Flash Player. Once the fake program was installed, Koobface controlled the computer’s search engine and directed the user to affiliated illicit websites offering various scams such as false investments, fake AV programs, fake dating services, etc. The Koobface botnet made money through pay-per-install and pay-per-click fees from these other websites. Sophos identified five potential members of the Koobface gang, also referred to as ‘Ali Baba & 4’ who operated from Russian and Czech locations. One member was older than the others and possibly the leader, but the structure of the group was not fully understood. Members of the group had previously worked in online pornography, spyware, and also attempted to conduct a legitimate mobile software and services business, MobSoft Ltd (Richmond, 2012). The Koobface crime group was able to regularly upgrade and adapt the botnet, which included an effective Traffic Direction System that managed the activity on affiliate sites and boosted the Internet traffic to the botnet (e.g. targeting showbiz fans, online daters, casual porn surfers, and car enthusiasts). The overall structure of the botnet was resilient; it survived takedown attempts and countermeasures by targets such as Facebook, Google, and other social networks. Data found in the botnet’s command-and-control system suggested the group has earned around $ 2 million a year. Financial enrichment was the group’s raison d’etre.

Let us now summarize the above cases: LulzSec was a loose network of like-minded hackers responsible for infiltrating the systems of high profile organizations, supposedly to draw attention to potential security failures. Dreamboard was a members-only group that
exchanged illicit images of children. DrinkOrDie was an organization devoted to piracy and the dissemination of pirated content. The four other organizations were motivated by financial profit. Each organization was the target of successful law enforcement action, and, as such, they may not be representative of other organizations whose members managed to avoid prosecution. One common characteristic of these groups was their trans-national reach. Each comprised members from different countries and was active across borders. Some members of these groups have been convicted for their cyber crimes.

State and State-sponsored cyber crime

One of the more significant developments in cyber crime over the past decade has been an apparent increase in the volume of illegal activity committed by governments or their proxies. Because of the sensitive nature of such activities, their nature and extent tend to be obscured from public view. Nevertheless, recent disclosures, some noted below, have been informative. One might envisage a continuum of state-private interaction, from state monopoly of criminal activity at one extreme, to state ignorance of private criminal activity at the other. In between these polar extremes, one might find formal collaboration between state and non-state entities; loose cooperation between state authorities and private criminal actors; active sponsorship by the state; tacit encouragement of non-state crime; the state turning a “blind eye” to the activity in question; and state incapacity to control private illegality (Stohl, 2014).

a. PLA Unit 61398

In February 2013, the information security company Mandiant reported that a large scale program of industrial espionage had been undertaken since 2006 by Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army. Based in Shanghai, this organization is alleged to have acquired a massive volume of data from a wide variety of industries in English speaking countries. Information alleged to have been taken includes technical specifications, negotiation strategies, pricing documents and other proprietary data. One of the alleged targets, a major US beverage manufacturer, was planning in 2009 what was to have been the largest foreign purchase of a Chinese company to date. It was reported that an apparently innocuous email to an executive of the US company contained a link, which when opened, allowed the attackers access to the company network. Sensitive information on pending negotiations was reportedly accessed by Chinese intruders on a regular basis; the purchase did not eventuate. It is unclear whether the unit is staffed exclusively by military personnel or includes civilian contractors (Mandiant, 2013; Sanger, Barboza, & Perlroth, 2013). In May 2014, five PLA officers were charged in absentia by US authorities with offences related to industrial espionage” (United States District Courts, USA v Wang).

b. Operation Olympic Games

Operation Olympic Games is reportedly a collaboration between the US National Security Agency and its Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200, intended to disrupt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. It allegedly involved the clandestine insertion of an extremely complex and sophisticated set of software (popularly referred to as “Stuxnet”) into communications and control systems at the Natanz nuclear facility. The software reportedly includes a capacity to monitor communications and processing activity, as well as the ability to corrupt control systems at the facility. The operation succeeded in
delaying the progress of uranium enrichment through remote controlled destruction of a number of centrifuges used in the process. The secrecy surrounding the operation was compromised in part when the malicious software escaped because of a programming error. Neither the United States nor the Israeli governments have yet to acknowledge the existence of the operation (Sanger, 2012).

Conclusion

The above discussion raises two basic questions. The first is whether organizations and individual offenders pursue similar goals. The second is the degree to which the McGuire and Chabinsky typologies fit with the cases we have summarized, and the relationship, if any, between crime type and organizational form. Since the cases in question were not randomly chosen, our conclusions cannot be regarded as definitive. Rather, they are tentative judgments that may serve as the basis for further inquiry. Although they may not be representative of cyber criminals generally, the individual offenders discussed above appeared less preoccupied with financial gain than with libertarian ideology, technological challenge, celebrity obsession, and revenge against a former employer. This is not to suggest that money doesn’t matter to solo cyber criminals. Rather, the observed variation enhances our appreciation of the range and diversity of individual motivations.

Organizations, too, reflected a variety of goals, including defiance of authority, freedom of information, sexual gratification of members, and technological challenge. However, the profit motive was more apparent in the organization cases than with individual offenders. One also notes the activities undertaken by organizations operating under state auspices, specifically those involving espionage and offensive cyber operations. These have explicit economic and political goals, which most certainly do not include the desire for publicity and notoriety. A comparison of individual offenders and criminal organizations reveals that both possessed impressive skills. Despite the formidable capacities of some individual offenders, the skills and resources of some organizations were truly extraordinary. However, the work of Drink or Die, Dreamboard and ‘Unlimited Operation’ all showed considerable complexity and sophistication.

As discussed above, the organizational structure depicted in Chabinsky’s model appears more characteristic of a sophisticated, enterprise-like fraud than of other crime types. The “Unlimited Operation” and Koobface cases would appear to provide the best fit. To a lesser extent, the “Drink or Die” group had a division of labour, involving at least six of the ten roles specified in Chabinsky’s model. The group’s lack of a significant financial motive precluded the need for “cashers”, “tellers” and “money mules.” McGuire’s typology would also appear reliable in light of the cases we have discussed. The state crime cases appeared to be consistent with a hierarchy, or, to the extent that non-state actors are involved, with the extended hybrid form. Complex frauds, such as ‘Unlimited Operation’ are also the work of hierarchies.

Discussion forums such as DarkMarket, an online bazaar associated with activities linked to online fraud, also exhibit features similar to a swarm. From forum administrators to regular members, the site allowed a range of cyber criminals and potential offenders with a common interest to come together to buy and sell stolen data. DNSChanger and Carberp exemplify closely knit group structures, which, can be hub like, as smaller groups tend to have stronger social ties between individuals. LulzSec, a suspected offshoot of Anonymous, is an example of a group with both swarm and hub characteristics. Made up
of a relatively small number of individuals, LulzSec has allegedly collaborated with the larger collective, Anonymous. As we have noted, “annoyance crime” and relatively complex protest activity such as that involving denial of service, seem most suited to a swarm. Protest activity of a more ad hoc, short term nature, is done by aggregate groups. Illicit markets and organized paedophile activity resemble hubs. To the extent that pedophile activity entails offline offending, it will take the clustered hybrid form.

The study of organized cyber criminal activity is in its infancy. Every new technology and every new application will create an opportunity that criminals will soon seek to exploit. In order to keep abreast of cyber crime it will be important to track the evolution of the organizational forms that these criminal activities will take. This article has taken a small step in this direction.

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